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Recognizing a Right to Autonomy for Ethnic Groups under
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights:
Katangese Peoples Congress v. Zaire
by Mtendeweka Owen Mhango*

The Justiciability of the
Right of Self-Determination

I

n 1992 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (the Commission) delivered a landmark decision in
Katangese Peoples Congress v. Zaire1 (Katanga) on the inalienable right of self-determination under the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).2 The Commission held
that self-determination under the ACHPR may only be achieved
in a manner that is consistent with the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo or
DRC). The decision continues to have great normative value
because it is the Commission’s first decision directly addressing the
right to autonomy in the post-colonial context since becoming
operational in 1987. Since Katanga, many indigenous groups in
Africa have vigorously asserted their right to self-rule, raising the
critical question of whether these groups are seeking independence
or simply autonomy. While no group has yet claimed the right to
autonomy on the basis of Katanga, the legacy of its holding
will greatly inform the potential realization of this right in the years
to come.
The ACHPR is currently the only regional human rights
instrument that permits the right of self-determination to be
the subject matter of communications submitted by entities other
than states. The right of self-determination is one of the most
important and perhaps controversial rights enshrined in the
ACHPR because it is the vehicle through which many African
states achieved independence from colonialism. Even today, many
ethnic groups continue to use self-determination to make claims
for self-rule. These post-colonial claims of self-determination have
put pressure on the Commission to define the scope of this right
in Africa.
This article argues that Katanga exhibits the Commission’s
favorable view of self-determination under the ACHPR, and the
likelihood that the Commission will recognize a right to autonomy
regime.3 While its decision in Katanga should be commended for
demonstrating that self-determination is justiciable under the
ACHPR, the Commission can be criticized for leaving several
unanswered questions. What is meant by “other forms of selfdetermination that are fully cognizant of recognized principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity”? Would the Commission have
reached a different outcome had the complainant requested an
autonomy regime that did not require Katanga’s independence
from the DRC? Are various ethnic and other minority groups
within Africa similarly entitled to self-determination? This article
seeks to address these questions and the lasting significance of the
Katanga decision.

Whether the right of self-determination is capable of judicial
enforcement elicited heated debate at the United Nations during
the drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights. The outcome of the controversy was the bifurcation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights into the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The contention that self-determination is a political principle and
not a right formed the basis for Western opposition to its inclusion
in the two instruments. The West argued that self-determination
was incompatible with a human rights convention based on
the protection of the individual and, as such, this “collective”
right could not be enforced by the Human Rights Committee
(the Committee) in the same manner as individual rights. Other
criticisms related to the economic aspect of the right of self-determination. Nevertheless, the West took part in drafting the text of
Article 1 of the two Covenants. Its inclusion in both Covenants
indicates that self-determination is both a civil and political
right and an economic, social, and cultural right. Furthermore,
the right’s inclusion in Part I of each Covenant underlines its
importance.
Another hotly debated issue was whether minorities (ethnic
or otherwise) should be accorded the right of self-determination.
The Soviet Union’s proposal that protection of minorities be dealt
with in the context of the right of self-determination under Article
1 was defeated because the rights of minorities are ensured in a separate provision of the ICCPR, Article 27. While the ICCPR has a
provision for judicial enforcement through individual petitions
pursuant to the First Optional Protocol, in Lubicon Lake Band v.
Canada4 the Committee ruled that an individual could not bring
a case for violation of Article 1 (i.e., for “peoples” rights). The
Committee held that the First Optional Protocol only provides a
procedure for petitions concerning violations of individual rights
set out in Part II of the Covenant in Articles 6 through 27.
Therefore, groups that attempt to assert their right of self-determination will have to depend on inter-state communication procedures and state reports — the former of which have yet to be used
— in order to clarify the Committee’s interpretation of this right
under the ICCPR.
Unlike the ICCPR, the ACHPR extends similar enforcement
mechanisms to all categories of rights. The Convention allows for
communications from states (Article 47) and individuals (Article
55) alleging violations of any rights, and the standing requirements
for bringing communications before the Commission are often liberally construed. Unlike the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR,
where the individual complaint procedures are severed from the
Covenant itself, individuals as well as NGOs with observer status
can bring communications against a state under the ACHPR.
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Because of this, the Commission has identified self-determination as a justiciable right under the ACHPR. In both Katanga
and Casamance Communication5 (Casamance), the Commission
accepted communications by ethnic groups alleging violations of
the right of self-determination. In both instances, the communications were brought by non-state parties, both requesting self-determination in the form of secession or independence. Overall, these
communications demonstrate that self-determination under the
ACHPR is justiciable like the Convention’s other enumerated
rights.6

but rather only the people of Katanga, a province within the DRC.
Yet because there was no evidence as to whether Katanga consisted
of more than one ethnic group, the Commission did not have to
define the term “peoples” in the context of self-determination.9 As
a result, it intentionally neglected to discuss the legal effect of
recognizing the inhabitants of Katanga as “peoples.” It instead
opted to focus its discussion of the right of a people to participate
in government.
It is in this respect that scholar Li-ann Thio has rightly criticized the Commission’s decision as politically motivated and lacking any precise legal reasoning.10 According to the Commission,
granting the people of Katanga’s request would contravene the
principle of uti possidetis, which the former Organization of Africa
Unity (OAU), now African Union, had pledged to uphold in the
Cairo Resolution.11 Ultimately, the Commission avoided discussing the more pertinent question of whether the term “peoples”
in the ACHPR includes ethnic groups by focusing on the question
of whether the right to participate in government was breached by
the DRC.

The Dispute in Katanga
In 1992, Gerard Moke, in his capacity as leader of the
Katangese Peoples Congress (KPC), the only political party representing the people of Katanga, brought a communication before
the Commission. The applicant presented the history of colonial
definition of the DRC’s political boundaries and its effect on the
territory of Katanga. It emphasized the disparate treatment of the
Katanga area by the colonial powers in the 19th century. The complainant requested that the Commission: (a) recognize the KPC as
a liberation movement entitled to support to achieve independence
for Katanga; (b) recognize the independence of Katanga; and (c)
help secure the DRC’s withdrawal from Katanga. The complaint
was brought under Article 20(1) of the ACHPR, which protects
the “inalienable right to self determination.”7 The request for some
form of assistance for the people of Katanga was presumably
brought under Article 20(3), which provides national liberation
movement’s the right to assistance from ACHPR States Parties.
The Commission found that there were no remedies available
under national law that would guarantee the independence of
Katanga from the DRC. Furthermore, the Commission could not
identify any specific allegations of violations of the ACHPR in the
complaint. Because neither the Commission nor the responding
state could justify dismissal on grounds that the complainant
failed to exhaust local remedies, in light of the fact that no such
remedies were available, the complaint was found presumptively
admissible.

“The applicant presented the
history of colonial definition of
the DRC’s political boundaries
and its effect on the territory of
Katanga. It emphasized the
disparate treatment of the
Katanga area by the colonial
powers in the 19th century.”

The Right to Self-Determination
& Participation in Government
The Commission has emphasized that all peoples have the
right of self-determination. It stated this right may be “exercised in
any of the following ways: independence, self-government, local
government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism, or any other
form of relations that accords with the wishes of the people but
fully cognizant of other recognized principles such as sovereignty
and territorial integrity.”8 The Commission also suggested that
where a people is able to establish a breach of the right to participate in government coupled with other verifiable human rights
violations (a scenario common in Africa), self-determination in the
form of secession may be possible under the ACHPR. Even though
the Commission correctly recognized the close relationship
between the right to self-determination and the right to participate
in government — as guaranteed in Articles 20 and 13, respectively
— it was also mindful to emphasize its duty to uphold the
fundamental character of the principles of territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
The Commission recognized that the Katanga communication involved not the self-determination of all peoples of the DRC,

Defining “Peoples” Under the ACHPR
For years, the debate on the criteria of the right of selfdetermination has centered on the definition of “peoples.” Since
the ACHPR purposely did not define the term, it could be
argued that this task was left to the Commission. It is, therefore,
important for the Commission to clarify this term in future
jurisprudence.
In Africa there appear to be two schools of thought on the
term. The first is represented by Commissioner Isaac Nguema,
who holds that “peoples,” as understood by the framers of the
ACHPR, applies to the entire population of the country — e.g.,
those that had formerly been colonized by European states, such as
Nigerians — without making a formal distinction between the
Yoruba or Minas.12 The African states have individually (under the
auspices of the former OAU) taken the position that self-determi12

The Cairo Resolution was motivated by boundary conflicts in
early 1963 between Somalia and Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia had
attempted to exercise the right of self-determination for Somalis
living in Ethiopia and Kenya. This claim was rejected by the former OAU in favor of Ethiopia’s contention that a claim for selfdetermination in the post-colonial context was unacceptable.18
The former OAU also favored Ethiopia’s position because of fear
that African governments would not ratify the ACHPR absent
such a prohibition.
Since the Cairo Resolution, which was affirmed by the decisions in Burkina Faso v. Mali19 and Katanga,20 claims of self-determination in the form of secession are prohibited under the
ACHPR in favor of claims that can be implemented without altering existing state boundaries. This, however, raises the question of
whether the Cairo Resolution, and the subsequent decisions
affirming it, amount to an implicit approval of autonomy claims
given that they can only be implemented in harmony with Article
3(3) of the former OAU Charter. In other words, since self-determination has been recognized as a justiciable right under the
ACHPR, does the prohibition of secessionist claims suggest the
approval of other claims of self-determination, which are not inimical to sovereignty and territorial integrity of states? If so, did the
decision in Katanga recognize such a right to autonomy regime
under the ACHPR?
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nation does not apply outside the colonial context because postcolonial application would undermine African unity. This school
of thought has been criticized for denying ethnic groups, many of
whom feel dominated by another group within their state, the
right to meaningfully participate in government.
The second school is represented by Commissioner Oji
Umozurike, who holds that it denotes groups of people that have
an identifiable interest, such as tribes or fishermen. For instance,
Article 19 provides that “no people may dominate another people,” but does not stipulate that “people” means all the people of
the country.13 Instead, the term could refer to members of ethnic
groups or even other social groups.
The Commission is well aware of these competing positions
but has failed to issue a definitive ruling to clarify the law in its
decisions in Katanga14 and Social and Economic Rights Centre and
the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria.15 For all practical purposes, Katanga seems to uphold the conservative position
represented by Commissioner Nguema, continuing to view the
right to self-determination within the colonial context. If the construction of the term “peoples” in the ACHPR is restricted to all
persons located within a state, then the people of Katanga and others may not be able to enjoy certain rights under the ACHPR, such
as those enshrined in Articles 19 to 24.
It is doubtful, however, that the framers of the ACHPR
intended to create a self-liquidating right of self-determination
only for those people who were formerly colonized. They must
have envisaged that Africa would eventually be free from colonialism but still burdened by other social and political problems that
necessitate claims to self-determination. It is important for the
Commission to construe self-determination as directly applicable
to ethnic groups as “peoples” entitled to this right. This interpretation is consistent with the ACHPR because it effectively recognizes
the ethnic composition of Africa.
Assuming Commissioner Nguema is correct to suggest that
the term “peoples” in the ACHPR only refers to those formerly
colonized, then it could be equally accurate to suggest that Article
20 and others similar to it were probably nullified when the last
colonized state in Africa became independent in 1994. Yet a correct interpretation is more in tune with Commissioner
Umozurike’s view that the ACHPR was created to prevent human
rights atrocities occurring both before and after its adoption.
Accordingly, the ACHPR should be interpreted in light of the
changing circumstances on the continent where self-determination
is viewed as an ongoing process relevant to current conflicts in
Africa.16

Displaced persons on Lake Upemba, Katanga, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Insight From the Canadian Context
In Reference re Secession of Quebec (Quebec),21 the Canadian
Supreme Court was presented with a challenge that raised a legal
issue similar to that in Katanga. The Quebec decision is relevant to
the analysis of Katanga because both the factual setting in which
the case arose and the legal conclusion reached by the Canadian
Supreme Court are similar. From a factual point of view, the complainants in both cases requested the right of self-determination in
the form of secession and alleged a breach of their right to participate in government. In both decisions the request for secession was
rejected, and no breach of the right to participate in government
was found.
Similar to the Commission, the Court in Quebec recognized
the relationship between the right to self-determination and the
right to participate in government.22 Unlike the Commission, the

The Cairo Resolution
Commissioner Nguema’s position that self-determination
does not apply outside the colonial context was the position
adopted in 1964 by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Cairo. The Cairo Resolution solemnly declared
“that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders
existing on their achievement of national independence”17 in a
manner that is in harmony with the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity in the OAU Charter. The Cairo Resolution is
relevant to the post-colonial application of self-determination
because it formed the basis on which Katanga was decided. The
Commission relied on this political resolution in setting the standard by which self-determination would be implemented in Africa.
13

Court went a step further and investigated the history of Quebec
peoples’ participation in government and found that Québécois
have held important positions in the Federal Cabinet; during the
eight years prior to 1997, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Official Opposition in the House of Commons were both
Québécois. At the time of the advisory opinion, the Prime
Minister, the Right Honorable Chief Justice and two members of
the Court, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Canadian
Ambassador to the United States, and the Deputy Secretary

ple” under the ACHPR as was done in Quebec. The Commission
has scrutinized this issue in the past when it considered claims for
secession from the Casamance of Senegal.26 There, the
Commission considered arguments put forward by a group claiming secession on grounds of “historical legitimacy”; “feelings of
frustrations for being governed by outsiders, and not truly sharing
their cultural traditions and aspirations”; and “the firm conviction
of being able to live better in a free and independent Casamance,
occupied chiefly with the well-being of its population and neigh-

“By basing so much of its ruling on political
considerations, however, the Commission effectively
undermined arguments for the recognition of a right
to an autonomy regime or the classic claim
for self-determination in the post-colonial era.”
General of the United Nations, were all Québécois.23 Based on this
finding, the Court concluded that Quebec cannot plausibly argue
that it has been denied the right to participate in government.
If the Commission were to apply a similar test, the outcome
would be very different from Canada’s case. Many ethnic groups
who seek self-rule in Africa often have a prima facie case against
their state for recognition of their meaningful right to participate
in government. Many of these ethnic groups have failed to test
their claims against the ACHPR because of the restricted understanding of “peoples” entitled to self-determination and participation in government.
In debating the definition of “peoples,” the Canadian Court
agreed with the views of Commissioner Umozurike when it
explained in Quebec that:

bors like Senegal.” The Commission rejected the claim for independence, partly out of fear that a claim of secession by one ethnic
group would provoke other ethnic groups in Senegal to do the
same.27
As demonstrated in Katanga and Casamance, it is unclear
whether the Commission may eventually recognize the right to an
autonomy regime for ethnic groups to exercise self-determination
internally. This article argues that the Commission would likely
recognize such a right given that self-determination for distinct
ethnic groups within states, according to the Commission, is
understood by reference to the idea of political autonomy or selfgovernment in the territory in which they reside and not based on
secession.28 This suggests that so long as a distinct ethnic group
wants to exercise its right to self-determination by way of creating
an autonomy regime within its state, the Commission would be
inclined to uphold such a claim.

It is clear that “a people” may include only a portion of the population of an existing state. The right to self-determination is
generally used in documents that simultaneously contain references to “nation” and “state.” The juxtaposition of these terms
is indicative that the reference to “people” does not necessarily
mean the entirety of a state’s population.24

Conclusion
For Africa, the Katanga decision marked a renewed commitment by the Commission to the implementation of the right of
self-determination. It demonstrated that this right is justiciable,
and established strong precedent for its judicial enforcement in
states. Importantly, Katanga is the first communication before the
Commission relating directly to the right of self-determination in
the post-colonial context.
By basing so much of its ruling on political considerations,
however, the Commission effectively undermined arguments
for the recognition of a right to an autonomy regime or the classic
claim for self-determination in the post-colonial era. Many of
the legal issues in Katanga will likely be adjudicated again, either
before the Commission or the soon to be established African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, in the context of recent

It is not clear whether this language resembles the
Commission’s view when it declared that “Katanga is obliged to
exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC.”25 On the one
hand, it is possible for one to conclude that the former language
resembles the latter text because the Commission’s view is that the
people of Katanga may exercise self-determination in some
restricted sense, thereby acknowledging that “people” may include
ethnic groups. On the other hand, it could be impossible for one
to conclude that these texts resemble each other because if they
did, the Commission’s conclusion in Katanga would have been different. The Commission would have had to clarify the term “peo14

indigenous groups’ claims of self-determination. Thus, it is important that several of the unanswered questions raised in Katanga
be resolved.
Katanga would have been more productive had it gone a
step further rather than simply upholding outdated notions that
seem to stand against stability in Africa. Since the Commission
recognizes that the implementation of the right of selfdetermination has internal as well as external dimensions, it
should have clarified the scope of the internal application of
this right. Morever, the Commission should have held that the
term “peoples” under the ACHPR may apply only to a portion of
the population of a state, such as Africa’s various ethnic
groups. Otherwise, the Commission’s descriptions of the different
forms of self-determination are meaningless if the term
“peoples” only refers to the entire population of the state. Given
that there is no definition of “peoples” in international law, this

article recommends that the Commission should liberally construe
the term.
Additionally, it seems likely, based on Katanga, that the
Commission would entertain claims of autonomy regimes rather
than full independence in light of its analysis of the different forms
of self-determination and its concern over sovereignty issues.
Indeed, the Commission would favor an autonomy regime because
of its goal of preventing conflict and the break up of states, all of
which appear to be essential elements of self-determination. Given
this analysis, had the KPC requested autonomy as opposed to independence, the Commission could have reached a different conclusion. To test the utility of Katanga, future litigants should clearly
indicate a request for autonomy rather than independence. In the
end, self-determination remains a remedial principle that should be
liberally construed to encompass suitable ethnic groups seeking
autonomy within ACHPR States Parties.
HRB
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